December 1864 was the dawn of the finale
of the Civil War. Union Generals recognized the end was near and seized every
opportunity to bring it to a close. Within the exchange of their letters,
General Halleck and General Sherman express a multitude of thoughts, feelings
and plans for their armies. The attitudes in regards to a “destructive war” are
that they had to take all risks because nothing risked is nothing gained.
Sherman knew they were facing not only a ‘hostile army but a hostile people’ as
well. The choices the Union high command made in regards to the “destructive
war” were for the advancement of the Union and devastation the Confederacy at
any means necessary. Historian Charles Royster would assess this exchange as extremely
insightful and essential item for assessing Sherman’s movements. My own
assessment of the significance of this exchange is that it proves the union’s
policy of the “destructive war” in a forward way. This paper will divulge the
details of these statements, exposing each question with a thorough discussion.
According to these two letters, the
Union high command’s attitude toward the Civil War as a “destructive war” is
rather forward. The two Generals are aware of the hostility of the enemy and
the indispensable advancements that had to be made. General Halleck commends
Sherman’s victories, expresses how the March will be remembered in this “great
war” and advises him to salt the ground around Charleston. He hopes that
Sherman will destroy Charleston and that “a little salt should be sown upon its
site it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession”.
The very idea of nullifying and succeeding a crop for an area of civilization
is in itself, the epitome of a destructive war tactic. Sherman replies to his
comments that he will keep it in mind.
He was not ecstatic about salting Charleston because he claims it is
“dead and unimportant when its railroad communications are broken”. Sherman has
all the capability and more to salt Charleston but he knows it is dead anyway.
In this case, it is a matter of the question of “why break something that is
already broken?” Instead, Sherman counters Halleck’s reserved request and
claims that he would rather take Wilmington. It is not a fear of salting
Charleston with an abundance of sympathy, but a strategic maneuver to destroy
something more useful to the Confederacy.
In his letter to Halleck, General
Sherman expresses his views on the southern population. He speaks of the
difference between this war and the European wars before it, “We are not only
fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young,
rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies.”
Sherman speaks of a different kind of war; a total war. In this case of war, a
destructive war is the only way to gain the upper hand. If they are not only fighting
soldiers, but also the entire populous, earthly destruction is a necessity.
Overall, the attitude of the Union high command is that the population, as well
as the soldiers, must feel the brutality and pain of the war they have chosen.
That is why Sherman chose to march his army through the entirety of Georgia as
forcefully as he did; to make this point very clear to the citizens of this
state. After his march, he confides that the state’s enthusiasm and
faithfulness in Jackson is wavering and that South Carolina is soon to join
them in their fear. Sherman’s March to the Sea was as emotionally destructive
as it was physically destructive for the southern population. His march proves
that he was not only warring against the southern army, but the southern people
as well.
The destruction of South Carolina was
much anticipated by Sherman’s army. “The truth is the whole army is burning
with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost
tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her.”
As destruction lies on the horizon in front of them, Sherman believes South
Carolina deserves the fate his army is going to bring upon it. This statement
is a great example of the attitude of the Union high command by revealing that
Sherman does not wish ill for the people and land, but he knows it must happen.
Upon reading these letters, Charles
Royster would find them to be extremely interesting, useful and full of
explanation. Throughout his book, The
Destructive War (1993), Royster excessively examines the mind frame,
strategy and justification Generals Sherman and Jackson used against each other
during the war. This letter contains key information from Sherman on his mind
frame and plans for the movement of his troops. Sherman explains to Halleck not
only why he wants to march one way, but also why he does not want to march the
other way. This letter exposes Sherman and the side of him that is not
necessarily sympathetic to the south, but not exactly as hard handed as he is
portrayed in media. He “almost trembles” at the fate of South Carolina, not
wanting to salt Charleston, and offering high respect and friendship to
Halleck. These examples are countered by other descriptions of destruction, yet
are interesting to know. Royster would surely be intrigued by the attitude that
Sherman expresses in this letter as well as the details of the possible
movements of his maneuverable army.
The significance of this exchange of
letters between Sherman and Halleck is that it truly expose the attitudes of
the Union generals. I find it more valuable to read and asses than I would find
reading and assessing a book on the subject matter. The firsthand account from
Sherman and Halleck provide a useful insight to the feelings, thoughts and
attitude of the Generals. I have gathered a pronounced understanding of the
Union’s attitude toward the “destructive war” by diagnosing the statements in
these letters. The attitude of doing
anything that would advance the Union and devastate the Confederacy while
showing the hard hand of war to the population was taken up by the high command
of the Union during the Civil War. Reading this directly from Sherman’s point
of view opened my eyes to his perspective, rather than a storyteller’s. It is
extremely important for historians to read primary sources rather than
secondary because it provides a different and direct insight to the
information.
From these letters that were exchanged
towards the end of the Civil War, Generals Sherman and Halleck converse their
thoughts and plans for the Union Army. While Halleck’s letter is more of a
congratulation, Sherman’s exposes more details and reasoning behind his
quandaries and actions. The letters uncover the Union’s views on the
“destructive war” policy of doing anything that advances the Union and
devastates the Confederacy. Charles Royster would find the information in here
extremely insightful as he has successfully uncovered the motives, thoughts and
feelings of Sherman in his book, The
Destructive War. These letters disclose the Union policy during the civil
war in a more informal, personal way.
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